'Border' Catholics and 'Normal' Catholics
—Gunnar D. Kumlien

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

Myths of U.S. Liberalism

by Michael Harrington

The Totalitarian as Diplomat

by Frank Gibney

George W. Jaeger Frederick D. Wilhelmsen Helen Iswolsky

olume LXI, No. 11 December 17, 1954 Twenty Cents

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THE COMMONWEAL
386 FOURTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 16

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Entered as second-class matter at the post office at Orange, Conn., under the act of March 3, 1879. Published weekly, printed and copyrighted 1954, in the U. S. A. by the Commonweal Publishing Co., Inc., 386 Fourth Ave., New York 16, N. Y., MUrray Hill 3-9685.

U. S. and Canada, $7 a year. Foreign, $9. Single copies, 20¢

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THE

Commonweal

week by week

THE PRESIDENT'S NEW LEADERSHIP

THERE can be no doubt that a major, a historic, shift has been made in the Administration's approach to foreign policy. This shift has been engineered by the President himself, obviously after he had taken great thought and accepted the clear danger it offers to the unity of the Republican party. Mr. Eisenhower's December 2 press conference, at which, in memorable and measured words, he made the shift clear, cautioning the nation against a foreign policy based on anger, truculence, and too easy hopes, plainly marked the end of one era and the beginning of a new one.

The change in our policy that is now signaled is weighted with historic possibilities on which the fate of the world may depend. In pleading for "the courage to be patient, tirelessly to seek out every single avenue open to us in the hope even finally of leading the other side to a little better understanding of our intentions," the President seemed to reject, finally, that "crusade" approach to the Communist problem for which he himself had been the major spokesman during the 1952 campaign; he now advances that limited, primarily political approach to foreign affairs for which others—most notably his critics—have hitherto argued.

What has happened? What has brought about this shift? One can only guess at an answer, but it would seem to be a good guess that in the 1954 elections Dwight D. Eisenhower was finally liberated from the partisan prison in which he had been entrapped since the early days of 1952—since that first Abilene speech in which he began to take up and recite the dreary litany of Republican bogeyman words, from "Yalta" to "Dean Acheson."

Since its early compromises with Republican extremism, the Eisenhower Administration has for two years been forced to make a quiet but continuing retreat from its campaign position. Each step in this retreat has moved it further away from the Knowland-Taft-McCarthy wing of the GOP. The Administration, for example, made the Bohlen appointment stick; it offered the Senate a Yalta resolution which was so mild that Senator Taft rejected it as, if anything, a vindication of the Democrats; it refused to risk military involvement in Indochina; it gradually set its power against Senator McCarthy and congratulated Senator Watkins for his work in securing the McCarthy censure; it has now opposed Senator Knowland.

The period of the President's apprenticeship thus seems finished. He has apparently at last taken over the active direction of his Administration and his party to mold them in that Eisenhower image which was effectively obscured for so long. The "real" Eisenhower has, perhaps, finally emerged.

WHAT the President has so far revealed of his Administration's new foreign policy direction is, of course, more a premise than a policy. The premise is co-existence—not "peaceful," but competitive. Mr. Eisenhower has rejected atomic war as a feasible instrument of national policy; he is determined to avoid it by all means possible short of appeasement and surrender of the national interests; he is willing (and he pleads with us to be willing) to wait upon long-range, partial solutions to the complex problems of our time.

All this, we repeat, is a premise rather than a policy—a noble premise, to be sure, and one which this magazine endorses, but still only premise. We wait for its implementation. And here we feel that the greatest danger is the old Republican danger of mistaking words for power, sentiments for policy, ideals for reality. Brave-sounding words were not enough to liberate the enslaved peoples. Unfortunately, talk about peace will not, in itself, promise peace. The most it can do is serve as a starting point, a basis for building policies fitted to the harsh realities of power. If peace is to be had it must be bought at the hard price of national sacrifice and strength.

It is one of life's unpleasant, inescapable paradoxes that in order to avert war a nation must be willing, under certain conditions, to wage war; it

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must be strong. The hope for peace can prove to be the worst enemy of peace if it should lead to the cutting of a nation's armed strength while there is danger of attack. The Administration, therefore, must continue to build the nation's defenses at an ever increasing rate, even while it explores practical avenues toward eventual disarmament. And since the world struggle is political as well as military, and will perhaps be won or lost on a political rather than on a military battlefield, increased attention must be given to winning the political struggle in Asia and in Europe. Here boldness must match vision to provide for meeting the age's revolutionary challenge in democratic terms.

This magazine has criticized the Eisenhower Administration in the past, but the ground of our criticism frequently was the inability of the President to act because of his surrenders to the extremist wing of the GOP. Along with other political independents we therefore find Mr. Eisenhower's new promise of leadership a tremendous and heartening thing. The President has begun to fight late, but he has begun to fight strong.

CHURCH-STATE DISPUTE

FOR over a month now reports about government clashes with priests, Bishops and lay leaders of Catholic Action have been emanating from predominantly Catholic Argentina. After eight years of comparative quiet the dictatorship finds itself at odds with the Church. The pattern is a familiar one. Relations between the two authorities are set forth in a concordat or other agreement—in this case the Constitution affirms that the Federal Government "supports the Roman, Catholic, Apostolic Church." But it is only a question of time in country after country under a dictator before serious differences arise.

On both sides in Argentina some efforts have been made to avoid a general open break. In their pastoral last month the national hierarchy reminded the faithful of their duties to the State and declared that Catholic Action remains "apart from and above all political parties." Juan Perón in his turn stated that he had no quarrel with the Church but with certain clerics who have "interfered" in politics.

But arrests of priests continue, several Bishops have been targets for government criticism and a feeling of uneasiness grows. The Vatican has felt called upon to reaffirm that Catholic activities should embrace whatever is related to the natural law "including social and political problems." The Perón regime through its captive press is conducting a campaign to discredit clergy and Church in general. The captive railway workers union, for one, has recently forbidden priests to attend any of its functions. Some sort of war is on.

Of the three zones of conflict the labor unions comprise the most important. They supply the main foundation of Perón's power. It is here that the accusations of "Catholic infiltration" fly thickest. Certain universities, with their politically articulate student bodies, provide a second battleground. Finally the regime is haunted by the possibility that a Christian Democratic party on the European model may be founded and provide effective opposition. So far the general public remains rather apathetic, but if the Argentine economy should continue to decline and Perón seek to distract the people by intensifying his drive against the Church, it could well result in grave popular disturbances.

NEXT WEEK

BISHOP ROBERT J. DWYER writes, in the Christmas Issue, about the meaning of home.

"For the Christian, the way home was marked out long centuries ago for generations of his forebears who had lost their way. It is the way that invites all men to come back home, back to the warm hearth and the dignity of simple things. It is the road that leads to the Cave of Bethlehem. In our universal experience, Bethlehem is home, even in the significance of its name, the House of Bread. Nor is this a mere figure of speech; it is indeed a symbol, but one whose terms correspond to a physical reality."

THE NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

WHATEVER the prospects for push-button warfare, push-button industrial production comes closer and closer. So real is the prospect that Walter Reuther recently made this a major point in his annual report to the CIO convention, stressing the fact that mass unemployment is a distinct possibility in the future if the wage level is not high enough to buy our expanding output.

Within the past ten years, practically automatic factories, machines and production techniques have been raising industrial output in phenomenal fashion. A new Ford engine-block assembly line manned by forty-one workers today produces the same output formerly turned out by one hundred and seventeen men. Sixty-five hundred workers in a modern steel plant can equal the production of eleven thousand men in older mills. Such examples

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do not mean that the era of automatic production is here; they do mean that in the next decade or two productivity per man-hour can be expected to jump sharply. Under such circumstances, the specter of mass-unemployment raised by Mr. Reuther is not merely the stuff of nightmares.

In other times, situations similar to this one have been met with an attack upon the machine, and today there are many who will want to curb the revolutionary productive potentialities that are now appearing. For our part, we do not think the solution lies in that direction. Aside from the question of international poverty, millions of Americans desperately need to have the potential gains in output translated for them into terms of warmer clothing, decent housing, better food. More production can and should be a blessing, rather than a curse. The problem is to make sure that the fruits of increased production reach those who need them most.

In any consideration of the problem of push-button industry, therefore, it seems to us that the question of maintaining and raising purchasing power is essential. In the race ahead we must be sure that productivity does not outrun purchasing power. If "automatic" industry and mass unemployment were to arrive simultaneously, almost depopulated factories would be capable of great productive feats, while outside the unemployed workers would be unable to buy the products of our new technological skills. Then the paradox of bitter want in the midst of plenty would be even more striking than it was in the Great Depression.

These facts, it seems to us, give increased force to the already cogent arguments on behalf of raising the purchasing power of the lower one-third of the nation. We would, for instance, support the effort of Mr. James P. Mitchell, the Secretary of Labor, to win an increase in the minimum wage law from seventy-five cents an hour to eighty-five or ninety. We would endorse his request that the law be extended to several million more U.S. workers. But even this step, important as it is, remains just a step. If this nation is entering into a new industrial revolution, like any revolution it will have to be channeled along constructive lines. And this will take planning.

Some Americans have developed an almost pathological hatred for the word "planning." To a large extent this is due to the fact that in the last decade the term has become something of a political swear-word. But in the present context, it should be clear that planning of some sort is necessary. The real struggle should not center around whether or not planning is necessary; it should center around the question: "Who is going to do it?" Distaste for government planning in the economic area certainly should not lead people to favor no planning at all.

Technological progress does not have to turn into a triumph of machine over man. But it can unless prudence and foresight are employed early in the process. What is involved is not just a management problem, nor even just an industry problem. It is a national problem. A good way to begin to meet this problem would be serious labor-management consultations to see that the technological revolution benefits rather than bankrupts the United States.

Christmas gift subscriptions are now forging to the front in the closing weeks of the Thirtieth Anniversary new-reader campaign. The ground still to be covered is 2,605 new subscriptions. With Christmas so near, the insert in the December 3 issue is proving a handy means of ordering gifts; other readers of The Commonweal find it very convenient to use gift subscription coupons like the one on the back cover of this current issue.

COLONIALISM

ONCE upon a time the United States was world-famous as not only the exemplar of successful colonial revolution but as a most powerful enemy of colonialism everywhere. American strong-arm tactics in Latin America in the early years of this century did not break the idealized image held by Europeans and Asians; similarly, the hysterical Palmer raids which followed the first world war caused infinitesimal damage to the American image abroad when compared with the damage done by the relatively mild excesses of McCarthyism.

Why? Mr. P. Worsthorne in the November issue of *Encounter* suggests that the idealization of the past was a result of America's isolation from world affairs. So long as the United States was remote it could be romanticized. Now that it is deeply involved in world affairs, now that it is the shield rather than only the symbol of democracy, its action and its faults have global reverberations and the reaction of the anxious world is to reproach it bitterly for showing itself to be less than a symbol-on-earth.

This interpretation of America's contemporary situation is interesting in the light of reproaches directed against this country since the beginning of

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the cold war on the subject of colonialism. New reproaches will probably be coming soon when the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West New Guinea reaches the floor of the UN General Assembly. Here it is hard to see how the United States can avoid either abstention or a vote in favor of colonialism.

Indonesia is the most unstable of the new Asian democracies. Born in revolution against the Dutch (a revolution given considerable diplomatic support by the United States), it has progressed with uncertain steps through the postwar decade. It now has an unstable government, a large geographical area yet to come under the clear authority of the central government, and an exceedingly large and powerful Communist Party.

Indonesia is pressing for control of the western half of the island of New Guinea. Australia holds East New Guinea as a trust territory. The Netherlands hold the area now claimed by Indonesia.

New Guinea, as many have occasion to remember, lies north of Australia, alongside the Indonesian Archipelago. It is of great strategic importance in the Asian cold war, for if Indonesian democracy should fail and Communism take over, Australia would be in a most vulnerable military situation which would be compounded by Communist control of West New Guinea. Indonesia, New Guinea, and North Viet Nam would form a salient extending deep into the South Pacific.

The justification for the Indonesian claim is exceedingly slim. New Guinea is largely rain forest and is populated by scattered, primitive tribes. Its people are Papuan while those of Indonesia are predominately Malay. There is no demand from the people for self-determination for they are at a cultural level where those words are hardly meaningful. Indonesia, on the other hand, has, and had at the time it gained independence, a politically-conscious population; among the Javanese and Balinese in particular it had a sophisticated and highly cultured civilization.

The Indonesian claim is based almost entirely on geography. Yet if the Dutch, who have been far from the most enlightened of history's colonial powers, remain in New Guinea, a wound remains on the integrity of Southeast Asia. India, the Burmese, the Ceylonese, the Indonesians—none will be satisfied until all outposts of European power in Asia have been returned to Asian control. If the Asians are not equipped to administer the newly-won territory? That, Asians justly say, is the argument which has been used against every independence movement.

Any time a colonial area is evacuated by a European power a calculated risk is taken. The risk has paid off handsomely nearly everywhere; in a few places it has failed; in a few places failure to take the risk has produced catastrophe. But in New Guinea the risk seems entirely too great. America will not be able to avoid committing itself. Such are the unpleasant consequences of responsibility.

AN IMPORTANT FRONTIER

MEN ever find it easier to denounce evil than to do something positive about correcting it —whether confronted by Communism, juvenile delinquency, racism or whatever it may be. Serious spadework is what is hard to come by. For this reason the growing realization that secularism lies behind many of our current troubles has yet to result in much being done to overcome it.

The starting point, of course, has to be among believers themselves, for the separation of religion from everyday life has made great inroads among them. Secularism will continue to be in the general ascendant in this country as long as in their outlook and conduct religious adherents remain undistinguishable from their non-believing neighbors in their embodiment of materialistic values.

But at the same time is there no way of establishing the sort of contact between the religious-minded and the non-believing world that will help turn the tide? Higher education in the United States would appear to present many such opportunities. This is one conclusion to be drawn from the healthily realistic article of James J. Maguire, C.S.P., in the December 4 issue of *America*.

Father Maguire is writing primarily to take issue with another Newman Club chaplain as to the extent to which attendance at a non-Catholic institution imperils the Catholic students' faith. (And be it said in passing that he greatly favors a Catholic college education.) But in the course of his discussion Father Maguire makes a number of observations that indicate notable opportunities.

He finds that "smug agnosticism" is no longer dominant on the American college campus. "Newman directors are constantly approached by professors for clarification of points of Catholic doctrine and practice. They are frequently invited to lecture in classrooms and to participate in panels. These invitations would be multiplied. . ." Therefore, Father Maguire is opposed to alienating "those men of good will who are now beginning to look to the Church for wisdom and enlightenment." Where the American tradition of dedicated and disinterested scholarship is involved the opportunity must be extensive.

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Myths of U. S. Liberalism

A DISSENT FROM CERTAIN KEY TENDENCIES OF THIS COUNTRY'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES

MICHAEL HARRINGTON

LIBERALISM, as Lionel Trilling once remarked, is now the dominant American tradition. As a result, the very word has undergone a semantic beatification—like Flag and Home—and become pietistic and, in most cases, meaningless. Thus Senator Taft proclaimed himself a liberal in 1948, and the late author of a discriminatory immigration law was recently eulogized (by Senator McCarthy) in the United States Senate as a "true liberal."

Yet in spite of this confusion, there is a definable sense of the word. Historically, contemporary American liberalism is identified with the tradition of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, the organization of the Democratic party and the intellectual generalizations of Americans for Democratic Action. With the qualifications which the undisciplined, unideological nature of the American political party requires, this liberalism is the over-all attitude of the present Congressional majority. As such, it deserves careful study.

However, even within this historical, restricted sense of the word, pietisms abound. The image of the New and Fair Deals inextricably mixes fact and legend—as does any successful political image. But in this case, the distortion has its conscious element. The Blue Eagle of the NRA and the whole mood of the New Deal quite purposely played upon the dramatic and the legendary. And this increases the difficulty of political analysis. But such an analysis must be made. In economic policy, civil liberties and foreign affairs, American liberalism is as specific an approach to politics as exists in the United States. What it will be is probably what America will be.

In domestic policy, the roots of contemporary liberalism lie in the period between 1932 and 1938, the period of the New Deal. And here, at the very outset, one meets a legend: the brooding and benign figure of Franklin D. Roosevelt, usually pictured at his first Inaugural saying that all we have to fear is fear itself. It is no accident that this statement about fear is central to the image of liberalism and current domestic policy. For it is a psychological rather than a political point, and Roosevelt and the New Deal achieved the impact which they did on American life because of their spirit as much as because of their program. It is impossible to study those six years of the New Deal without getting a feeling of the excitement, the enthusiasm, the attitudes of purposiveness which were then pervasive. For this reason, it is not sufficient to estimate the meaning of liberalism in this period in terms of program alone.

I sometimes feel that this fact accounts for a key attitude on the part of liberals who went through the emotional experience of the New Deal. In current situations they often seem to be asking, "Where is the spirit, the excitement?" It is precisely this quality which a man like Max Lerner finds so important to report in describing a Mendès-France.

And yet, if we are to understand American liberalism, the enthusiasm, the charismatic figure of Roosevelt, must be separated out, and the program analyzed. For it is the program which is relevant today—the enthusiasm of a given period cannot be inherited; the ideas can. We must, therefore, examine the claim—made in this instance by Arthur Schlesinger after the 1952 elections—that the reason that Stevenson lost was that the "Roosevelt revolution" was so victorious that it was not even an issue. What, then, was the Roosevelt revolution?

TO begin with, if Roosevelt's was a revolution it was an accidental one. The New Deal program was empirical and experimental rather than planned or ideological. It contained the corporatist NRA, Keynesian financial techniques, the TVA. In the mythic image of retrospect, it is usually pictured as an Americanized social-democracy, based on the labor movement, defeating the depression, redistributing wealth.

In the immediate terms of relief, there can be no doubt that such a characterization approaches the truth. Roosevelt and the New Deal *did* establish programs for food and clothing and rent and work.

Mr. Harrington writes frequently on political and literary questions for this and other magazines.

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Moreover, various permanent social reforms were achieved: unemployment compensation, social security and the like. But it is not upon such actions that the myth of the "Roosevelt revolution" rests.

According to Mr. Schlesinger, during the Roosevelt era a structural change was made in the American economy. The revolution actually achieved, if not a new, then a radically modified, form of society, that of welfare capitalism. Here one is confronted with the marriage of American liberalism and John Maynard Keynes. This, more than anything else, is the heart of the New Deal.

IT is at this point that one meets an important contradiction between fact and legend: Roosevelt and the New Deal did not solve the depression. The "built-in stabilizers" of reform legislation which current liberal theory sees as being able to cope with the economic problems of the fifties did not, in fact, cope with the economic problems of the thirties. Unemployment was still massive after eight years of the New Deal (and by massive I mean in the neighborhood of ten million, and this in a much smaller working force than today). More, after five years of the New Deal, in 1937, there was a recession more precipitous than the one in 1929.

The end to unemployment did not come as a result of the New Deal. It came through the growth of an armament economy. This fact is basic to an analysis of liberalism, past and present, and yet, to my knowledge, only one liberal, Chester Bowles, has admitted it. The incidental legends—that the American labor movement was "organized" by Section 7(a) of the NIRA, for instance—become insignificant in relation to this point.



This is all the more important because it is here, in the defense of Keynesianism and the image of the New Deal's success in the thirties, that liberalism has become most theoretical. The Harvard economist, J. K. Galbraith, wrote in the New York *Times* about a year ago that if the armament expenditure were stopped, we would simply shift to socially useful expenditure. This is the theory of the built-in stabilization. Is it true?

Keynes himself made the most acute criticism of his own theories. He remarked that he wondered if any capitalist government could actually intervene to the extent necessary to insure a stable economy. The reason for his doubting was this: would such a government be *politically* able to take the steps demanded?

War production is justified to the public by the threat of the enemy, by patriotism, and all of the unity which this implies. But as Roosevelt discovered in the thirties (and remember that he himself did not "accept" Keynesianism until the late thirties), powerful, perhaps dominant political forces severely limit peace-time pump-priming. It is a paradox that these forces are the very ones that are helped by the fiscal action, but a very *real* paradox nevertheless.

But the question is even larger than that of the efficacy of techniques for stopping a depression. It involves a far more basic claim, one made by Galbraith and Schlesinger and almost all of the theoreticians of liberalism: that the New Deal structually altered the American economy and created a new kind of society, a welfare capitalism. And here, the actual failure of the New Deal to solve the crisis of the thirties should make us supiscious of any claim that at the same time it made future crises impossible.

Thus in the area of domestic policy, the liberal image is a somewhat distorted reflection of a complex reality. The distortion goes beyond that normal to politics, for the liberal past, its very success, rested to a certain extent on the ability to manipulate the mythic and the legendary. The chief fact which must be kept in mind is that the "Roosevelt revolution" failed of its immediate task: the solution of unemployment.

IN the area of civil liberties, American liberalism achieved something of an ironic climax in the passage of the Humphrey-Dies anti-Communist law last summer. Here was the spectacle of an abject capitulation by liberalism to illiberalism. Why did it happen?

The answer, I think, is more immediate than in the case of economic policy. Its roots lie in liberalism's past attitude toward Stalinism and its present attitude. For the question of civil liberties in our day is largely one of the rights of domestic Stalinists.

During the period of the Popular Front, and then again during the war years, American liberalism was taken in by Stalinism. The liberal did not become a Communist. His innocence is certainly comprehensible. But the plain fact of the matter is that Stalinism, and Stalinist agents, penetrated to the very center of American policy and power. An important medium of this infiltration was American liberalism. When this fact

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first became public knowledge, the liberal reaction (remember the Hiss case and the emotions which it engendered) was that the charges were a "red herring." Unfortunately, they were not. And in the crazy world of politics, it was an almost inevitable step from Mr. Truman's "red herring," to his proud boast (in reference to the Smith Act convictions), "I put my Reds in jail."

In other words, precisely because of its belatedness in admitting the fact of Stalinist infiltration, American liberalism became the captive of its critics. The result was a wholesale move toward the right. It was a liberal, Harry Truman, who had the Attorney General's List drawn up (no organization on that list was given a hearing, nor has one yet), who started the type of loyalty and security program we now have, who changed the criteria of loyalty to that of "risk" and "reasonable doubt," who invoked the Smith Act. The major institutions of the American witch-hunt were created by liberals—under protest to be sure, but by liberals, nevertheless. In the campaign of 1952, these institutions were endorsed by Adlai E. Stevenson.

I would be the first to argue that the softness of American liberalism toward Stalinism was historically understandable. It was part and parcel of the mood of the times; in the Hiss case a generation was, indeed, on trial. But one of the results of this never-admitted fact is that the liberal's approach to civil liberties today is based primarily upon the proposition, "I am a better Red hunter than you." This is true not only in the case of the new Humphrey-Dies law; it has been true for almost a decade, from the first Attorney General's List, on through the Smith Act, to the present. Unable to work out a positive, political answer to Stalinism even today, the liberal supports the coercive framework of our present policy. In his attitude on domestic liberties, he makes the mistake of supporting a purely coercive struggle against Stalinism, rather than a political struggle. The result is tragedy. For outside of a few fairly ineffective individuals and groups, no one in the United States today, certainly not the liberal, is making a traditional democratic defense of freedom.

It is in this area that we are confronted with the most spectacular breakdown of American liberalism. For whatever may be the pieties of Adlai Stevenson about freedom in general, we have the reality of the Attorney General's List, the Smith Act convictions—and now, the Humphrey-Dies anti-Communist law.

IN foreign policy, American liberalism has a history which goes back for only seven years. For it was in 1947 that the nature of Stalinism, ignored during the years of the "great democratic ally," asserted itself forcefully. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the famous article by George Kennan, date back to this period.

In its inception, the foreign policy of American liberalism was based on the notion of struggling toward co-existence. The slogan was that we would "negotiate from positions of strength." Seven years later, the "positions of strength," including the hydrogen bomb, exist, but there is, among liberals, a certain fuzziness

as to exactly what the "negotiation" should be. This is not accidental.

In the development of foreign policy, the liberal has, in recent years, committed himself to the notion of military preparedness, to a military struggle against Stalinism if necessary, but has separated this from political struggle. This is what is involved in the inability to know what to negotiate about.

And the central criticism here is that this separation of the political from the military is impossible in the modern world. All of the struggles of the cold war, even the military ones, are *primarily* political. For example, an America which has a certain military success in Korea, but within the context of support of Syngman Rhee, has not won at all. It is not a question of square miles of land taken, defended, destroyed, or whatever else war involves. It is, in both Asia and Europe, a question of people—of politics.

UNTIL this is realized, there are no alternatives—unless hydrogen war is an alternative. In Indochina, for instance, how would a Stevenson Administration have distinguished itself from the Eisenhower policy? I suspect it would have done so by compounding the tragedy through military intervention. Precisely because a liberal Administration would *not* have been as hesitant and bumbling, it is more likely that it would have intervened. And a struggle such as this one in defense of capitalist imperialism cannot really be won in this century. It is a terrible thing that Stalinist imperialism can win, but it is true and it is not a mystery. It can win because of its political appeal, false as that appeal may be.

Within such a situation, it is not enough for the liberal to ridicule the ineptitude of Dulles and Eisen-

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hower—an easy task. The challenge to the liberals is far more serious. To answer it they must ask why the Marshall Plan had such a limited effect (because its political consequence was power to the ruling class and not food and housing to the mass of people), why Point Four has failed (it is now militarized, an adjunct of the Mutual Security Administration), why the tragedy of Indochina.

In Thailand, for example, the United States is supporting a corrupt, semi-fascist government. It is one of the bastions of the "free world" included in the SEATO agreements. And it is an obvious breeding ground for a Viet Minh type campaign on the part of the Stalinists. Indeed, there is already a "Free Thai" movement, controlled by the Stalinists, in existence. At this stage, what is liberalism's answer to the problem? Are we to wait until we are confronted with actual military conflict and then argue lesser-evilism: "I don't like the Songgram government any more than the Rhee, but. . . ." If not this, is there to be Point Four? Then what kind of a Point Four—with what politics? Will it be a program enriching the status quo? Will it envision, as the original Point Four did, the "creation of a favorable atmosphere of investment" for American capital?

The other day I leafed through a book distributed by ADA called *The Only War We Want*. In pictures, it tells graphically of the need for some kind of a program for the improverished peoples of Asia. That part of the liberal ideology, the recognition of the problem, is often adequate. But what political proposals follow? Pilot projects, with the bulk of expansion to be financed by private American capital? This was the original Point Four. It is not enough. And if it is to change, if Thailand is not to be Indochina, the liberal must think out the nature of the political appeal which must be made in the struggle against Stalinism. And so far, only Justice William O. Douglas, among liberals, has indicated the beginnings of an answer: support for *democratic* revolution.

In foreign policy, the Eisenhower-Dulles approach is a continuation of the Truman-Acheson approach. The liberal has nothing radically different to offer in this area. Worse, he still makes the suicidal point of military struggle first, *then* political struggle—as if the two can be separated in such a way.

THIS analysis of American liberalism has been brief, and therefore inadequate. I would like to close with some even briefer remarks about American liberalism's psychology.

There exists an almost Calvinistic sense of salvation among the liberals. Each in-group—Conservative, Radical, Right or Left—has its *ésprit;* this is necessary. Yet there is a certain smugness, a complacency, probably the result of twenty years in power as much as anything else, which is basic to the contemporary liberal attitude. From this point of view, it is important that "we" get elected, regardless of program. An ADA fund-raising letter which was concurrent with the anti-Communist law this summer was almost grotesque in this respect: it asked, what would happen to civil liberties if Hubert Humphrey were not in the Senate?

And the second psychological point concerns the empiricism of the American liberals. Their hostility to political ideology is the inheritance of a long American tradition. And in the pragmatic world of politics, such a pragmatism has achieved its notable successes. But it is not an unmixed virtue. For its concomitant is a perpetual attitude of surprise, as if each new war, revolution or depression was the result of parthenogenesis. The consequence is a certain inability to project, to apply the lessons of Indochina to, say, Thailand.

These two attitudes relate, in turn, to the over-all problem of liberalism. For unless the liberal is able to introspect upon his experience in a more methodical way, unless he is able to separate the myth from the

reality, the consequence may well be tragedy, not for the liberal alone, but for the United States as well. Critical as I am of the liberal reality today, I feel that there are tremendous elements within the liberal tradition—its adherence to democracy, above all—which are very much relevant to our situation. One of my chief objections is that they are not being utilized.

In domestic policy, the liberal must make a saner, less emotional estimate of his recent past—he must examine the current image of the "structurally-new" welfare capitalism more carefully. In the matter of civil liberties liberals must make an almost complete reversal of the current trend, an agonizing reappraisal of the rights of the individual and of the government in the problem of loyalty and security. In foreign policy, liberals must draw upon the resources of democracy, not for rhetorical speeches, but in the very real context of forming a policy for a revolutionary Asia and a discontented Europe.

Otherwise, we may soon have reached the terrible point at which Livy found Rome: ". . . we can no longer support either our vices or the remedies which would cure us of them."

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The Totalitarian as Diplomat

"HE HAD APPRECIATED THE FACT OF POWER EARLY, AND EARLY MADE HIS PEACE WITH IT"

FRANK GIBNEY

THE late Andrei Januarevich Vishinsky will probably go down in current history as one of the most anti-moral men of our time, and one of its most superb diplomatic spokesmen. His anti-morality became so well-known, precisely because he, of all the representatives which Moscow has sent to post-war world conferences or secret meetings, knew most about the world outside Communism and, indisputably, most liked it. As *the* Soviet spokesman of the past ten years, moreover, he was in charge of expounding and defending (although never in defensive language) the most bare-faced, two-faced policy that the poor diplomatic world has ever seen. He did this with such personal gusto that the policy became identified with him. The diplomats who knew him best thought it very suitable that his middle name called to mind the double-faced Greek god Janus.

It is worthwhile to study the career of Andrei Vishinsky in this connection. American foreign policy is accused, sometimes justly, of being falsely moralistic, just as the British were once accused of being falsely legalistic. But the sophisticated diplomat who winks knowingly at the efforts of American statesmen to put some kind of morality into foreign relations, might recall that Vishinsky represented the opposite pole—and one far more dangerous. He was the utter cynic. Probably the only basic premise he believed in was his statement during the 1938 Moscow purge trials: "two worlds face each other as irreconcilable and deadly enemies—the world of capitalism and the world of socialism." Accepting this as a fact as much as a conviction, he performed his diplomatic duties with the single-minded zeal of a good tactician. He would doubtless have dismissed any moral considerations involved as hopelessly secondary to the political fact. He probably would have been happy to be called a European realist. Unfortunately, as the promises and counter-promises of coexistence flutter about, with American policy doing little to clarify them, there will probably be increasing numbers of Europeans like him.

What most fascinated Vishinsky's foreign acquaintances was the polar difference in manner between him and faceless younger Soviet representatives like Jakov Malik or Andrei Gromyko. Old embassy hands in Moscow remember the contrast, as set forth in the Foreign Office receptions there. The sub-zero smile of Molotov, followed by the stiff and serious faces of Gromyko and Gusev, used to create the friendly cordiality of a wax museum. Vishinsky, by contrast, had the relaxed dignity of a master of ceremonies at a gourmet's convention. Beaming and full of passing quips, he seemed to cherish a friendly intimacy with every guest there.

In the UN meetings over the years, he turned out to be a genuinely witty and amusing conversationalist —whenever he was off the set. He was quite capable of denouncing another delegate in very personal terms at an official meeting ("This little man," he once said of General Carlos Romulo, "makes as much noise as an empty barrel") and then play the gracious host to the same man, or send flowers to his wife, the same evening. Unlike the standard Zis models of Soviet robot diplomats, he was capable of joking about sacred subjects like the doings of his superiors. He once chuckingly told some Western diplomats about an embarrassing wartime moment, when General de Gaulle was wringing an unusually heavy concession from Stalin. "You've made such a clever deal, General," Stalin said, with a side-look at Molotov, "that I think I'll have to send Molotov to Siberia." Molotov, Vishinsky loved to relate, turned white.

A bon vivant in the classic European sense (Paris, of course, was his favorite town) Vishinsky enjoyed the theater, as well as playing the host at lavish lunches or dinners at whatever Russian embassy he happened to be making his headquarters. Pandit Nehru, one of his guests, once noted: "Mr. Vishinsky in his speeches is often very fierce. But he relaxes considerably after a good meal."

VISHINSKY'S great value to the homeland of ruthless collectivism was precisely that he was, tactically speaking, such an individualist. The gusts of anger in his speeches, his hodge-podge of literate and ap-

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posite citations, from Krilov the Russian, to Virgil the Roman,* made them among the most quotable pronouncements of current international diplomacy. Although his line was always straight from Moscow, his masters let him play it out as he wished, and his variations in tone and intensity were always unpredictable. A fellow UN delegate, trying to explain one of Vishinsky's especially violent tirades, suggested that an attack of bronchitis might have put him in a bad humor. He could not have said that seriously about anyone else at the UN.

Vishinsky was a great individual performer, a master of logic, even if it was generally crooked; a maker of great phrases, even if they generally concealed base motives. He was the cleverest debater the UN ever had. He could make a fervent speech about, say, the "inalienable rights of the minority" at some UN meeting that listeners would instantly dismiss as either boring, laughable or brutally ironic, if any other Russian made it. When Vishinsky made the speech, the gallery listened. So great was his magic that his words seemed temporarily plausible. At times when the Russians knew a given policy could never get UN approval, Vishinsky was always useful for at least creating a little helpful discord.

The conclusion of his UN acquaintances that Andrei Vishinsky was, to a greater or less degree, a cynic, was forced upon them by the manifest illogic of some arguments which Vishinsky, an intelligent man, was called on to advance. As one Security Council representative once observed, "Whenever I see Vishinsky blustering, I have an ungovernable temptation to look him in the eye and wink." This view of Vishinsky was reinforced by the circumstances of his life. He came of a well-to-do bourgeois Polish family, with some noble connections, thus acquiring a kind of background which most of the other revolutionaries lacked. He was probably a sincere Menshevik, and worked for seventeen years towards the Menshevik kind of gradual revolution. Perhaps it was just after the Bolsheviks put themselves in power that the fact of power, and the need for making peace with it, were forcibly borne in upon him. His motives for suddenly switching to Bolshevism in 1920 were highly suspect. In Russian legal circles, even after he gained some prominence, his colleagues continued to think of him as basically insincere.

His conduct of the Moscow purge trials, of course, made him famous. In later years, whenever a foreigner brought up the subject, Vishinsky would grin and say nothing. He didn't have to. The world never forgot the brutal tongue-lashings he gave at the trials of Bucharin, Yagoda and the others, or the cry, "Shoot the mad dog!" delivered in his perorations. It was then that his sardonic quips first came into public notice. At one point, for instance, hearing that a defendant was working on his autobiography, Vishinsky congratulated him with a sneer: "You are very fortunate, indeed. You are the one author of an autobiography who knows the exact date when you'll finish it."

For ten years, on and off, Vishinsky brought something of the air of that dark Moscow courtroom into the world's diplomatic conclaves. He spoke almost constantly as the bullying advocate, the man who would argue any case (naturally within his peculiar charter) and, before his speech was over, almost have himself believing it.

No one who has seen the spectacle will ever forget one of Vishinsky's classic speeches. The room would grow quiet as the rather kindly man in the neat blue suit rose to speak, looking a little like an absent-minded history professor who had wandered in from the guided tour outside. In fast, rhythmic sentences he would begin his argument. As he spoke, he began to change character. His clear, slightly brittle voice became alternately soft and loud, pleading and threatening. He waved the stubby arms. The overlong white cuffs, usually meticulously stuffed into his coat, now flapped loosely below his jacket sleeves. The calm, rubicund face became flushed, beet-red. The sharp, blue eyes threatened.

The language, oddly for such a revolutionary representative, was Ciceronian and rather old-fashioned, full of significant repetitions, and beautifully worked climaxes. The Russian was letter-perfect, although so fast that few interpreters could easily follow him. All of it was extemporaneous, the result, generally, of some flimsy notes he had scrawled during the remarks of the speaker before him.

Only occasionally was Vishinsky really trounced in debate. One most significant time—ironically enough, in view of the attacks on Jessup's "Americanism," since —was by Professor Philip Jessup, while representing the United States in the Paris meeting of 1948. In making the case for the U. S. at the time of the Berlin blockade, Jessup, by trade a scholar of international jurisprudence, gave one of the most balanced and juridical indictments of Russian policy ever voiced, done in the calm, unspectacular accents of Anglo-Saxon law. The effect of his summation made Vishinsky, for a change, seem more like a prisoner at the bar than an equal participant at an international diplomatic conference.

For Vishinsky, a Russian lawyer's idea of the law, as he sometimes discussed it during his diplomatic days, significantly reflected his anti-morality. "Law," he explained, "is nothing but an instrument of politics.

* Herbert Evatt, when he was representing Australia at an early UN meeting, once decided to give Vishinsky some of his own proverbial medicine. "As the old Ukrainian proverb goes," Evatt would lead off, "'if you can't take it, don't dish it out.' Or as the Byelo-Russian folk tale says, 'When it rains, it pours. . . .'" After a few more such, Vishinsky got the joke.

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You cannot oppose law to politics or to policy. Policy uses law as an instrument, as a tool for its implementation. . . ."

No one, also, more thoroughly defined the theory of Soviet statism. "The state," he said at one UN meeting, "has one big right, one holy right, the right to adopt decisions without being accountable to anyone else whatsoever. Such a decision and such an opinion is a sovereign right which is uncontrolled, and no state can be made accountable to anyone for making a decision."

DID Vishinsky believe in anything? Certainly his conduct at the Moscow trials, and when he engineered the Communist taking over of Latvia in 1940 and Romania in 1944, showed him a man not moved by ordinary moral considerations. He had begun, granted, as a convinced Marxist. In so far as he lived in the "world of socialism," as he called it, he probably believed in it. He was probably, also, a strong Russian nationalist, in the same way that Stalin was—his nationalism doubtless reinforced by his Polish origin. If the West was his enemy, he saw it not only as the enemy of the new Marxist Russia, but also as the traditionally suspect West of his spiritual forebears, the statesmen of Old Russia.

But a root belief in Marxism and in Russia could hardly begin to justify the constant backings and fillings, the unending justification of immoral acts ordained by the policy of the Soviet state—not, at least, to a highly intelligent, cosmopolitan European like Andrei Vishinsky, for such he was. It would be just to say that he had appreciated the fact of power early, and early made his peace with it. His only excuse for that, if any, was not conscience, nor conviction, but his awareness of the fact of power. Once he had accepted it, he went on to enjoy himself as a virtuoso diplomat, a classic example of a new and horrifying order.

Still, the UN and a good many people will be curiously lonesome without him. Probably this is because Andrei Vishinsky had made himself so much a part of our world these days, and there is always a feeling of some regret at the loss of any familiar thing or person, however much he has served evil, however strongly he has striven, by stressing a crude absolute right of power, to undermine the only foundation on which any international cooperation can develop—the abridgement of absolute power by common consent.

It might be timely to recall an old conversation which two UN officials once had on this subject. "I couldn't imagine him not being here," the first man said. "After all, the UN without Vishinsky would be almost like 'Hamlet' without the Prince of Denmark." "Or at least," the other corrected him, "without the gravedigger."

FROM ITALY

'Border' Catholics and 'Normal' Catholics

Rome

ITALIAN Catholics are a quite unusual lot. Through the centuries Catholics in distant lands have looked upon them with criticism, with awe and envy. They are so close to the throne of Saint Peter; so many popes have come from their midst; they are so familiar with holy things and yet apparently so frivolous, so superficial.

The strange Italian mixture has puzzled other Catholics for centuries. Before the Reformation this puzzlement appears in the letters of Saint Bridget of Sweden and other pilgrims from Germany, France and England. In them the note of criticism often seems to predominate. Since the time of Luther, Protestants have tended to see Italian Catholicism as more characteristic of Catholicism than of Italy. For many of them, Italian Catholicism *is* Catholicism; they do not see the enormous difference between Italian Catholicism and Irish Catholicism—or German or French or Spanish Catholicism.

During one of his recent visits to Italy, Bruce Marshall had some difficulties in explaining the position of Catholics in Great Britain to an Italian audience and he asked them to keep in mind that English Catholics are "border" Catholics in the Catholic world—a minority—whereas Italian Catholics are, so to speak, "normal" Catholics in an all-Catholic country. This distinction proved successful. There *is* a difference between "border" Catholics and "normal" Catholics. The "border" Catholics behave like any other minority—including the Americans. They are strongly conscious of what makes them different from the majority, and usually are well-organized, with the militant spirit considered necessary for survival.

This minority, or Diaspora, complex is particularly evident among Jews. But since the Jewish people made the tremendous effort of attempting to "normalize" themselves in Israel, the difference between Jews scattered over the world and the Jews born in Israel is striking. The Diaspora Jews tend to be keener, brighter—sometimes with a neurotic touch—and often appear to possess more rapid reactions than the Jews born in Israel. There the natives seem as slow and earthbound as peasants in any country.

During the war in Palestine in 1948 I discussed this matter several times with Arthur Koestler. I said

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that it was my impression that Israeli Jews are gradually losing what up to now has been considered a characteristic of Jewish intelligence. He returned to his parable of the pearl oyster. The Diaspora Jews are often like oysters with precious pearls in them, he said; but an oyster with a pearl is an oyster which is sick and presumably unhappy. The normalized Israeli Jews, then, are just ordinary happy oysters without pearls, and from their point of view this situation is an advantage.

NATURALLY, the Jewish case is an extreme one, but there is something of the same difference between minority Catholics and "normal" Catholics. Minority Catholics with their militant spirit sometimes seem to have the impression that normal Catholics are lukewarm in their faith, perhaps ignorant of it, and superficial. They apparently feel that normal Catholics often harbor surprising contradictions which are hardly compatible with what would be expected from a "good" Catholic; that they frequently have a certain skeptical attitude towards holy things and a lack of respect for the clergy. The normal Catholics, on their side, often have the impression that border Catholics exaggerate, are fanatic, formalistic and naive. This difference between the two groups partially explains the criticisms of Italian Catholics which are voiced by other Catholics—usually border Catholics—but it accounts for it only partially.

An event which throws light on this situation happened in Rome eighty-four years ago when Italian troops conquered the city and deprived the Pope of his temporal power. Many Italians have heard their fathers recall the event in detail and speak of the emotions they then felt when the King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel II, sent his famous rhetorical message to Pope Pius IX: "With the love of a son, with the faith of a Catholic, the loyalty of a king and the feelings of an Italian. . . ." Thus the message began; it went on to ask respectfully but firmly that the Pope surrender his temporal power. Pius IX refused and Rome was taken by force. In the eyes of many Catholics all over the world the King of Italy then represented the forces of evil; Catholic volunteers fought and died for papal temporal power. Today there are few in the Vatican who do not think that the long-range effect of this was good, for the effect of depriving the Pope of his temporal powers was to increase his spiritual influence.

That is one example. There are others, and the Italians remember them well. Each time there is a question of political Catholicism, crusades against the "forces of evil" in the political order, the old folks in Italy say something like this: "We have heard that before; the Popes have proved to be far from infallible in political matters; who knows what they will say about this thing in the Vatican fifty years from now?" It is precisely this state of mind which constitutes one of the greatest handicaps to the Christian Democratic Party's anti-Communist propaganda activities.

Please note that this is the kind of talk heard from the most convinced Catholics. It naturally sounds skeptical, "lukewarm," to the ears of Catholics from border areas or even to those from other all-Catholic lands. But the strange thing is that this Italian attitude is very often accompanied by the greatest forbearance for the human weaknesses of the representatives of the Church and the deepest conviction that the survival of the Church in spite of these human weaknesses is proof of her divine origin.

A similar attitude is frequently displayed by members of the Italian clergy. Recently one of the most distinguished Latinists in the Roman Curia, Monsignor Antonio Bacci, wrote a novel (with, of course, an Imprimatur from his superiors) in which he contrasts a small and poor country parish with the *pompa* of the Vatican. He tells in the course of the novel the following joke about the origins of Vatican diplomacy, which is so old, he says, that it goes back to Saint Peter himself. One gloomy night in Jerusalem, when Saint Peter was warming himself before a fire, he was recognized by a servant girl who pointed to him and said, "You, too, are a follower of the Galilean. . . ." Peter replied that he did not know what she was talking about. This, the Monsignor's joke goes, was a most diplomatic answer, and Vatican diplomacy has more or less worked along these lines ever since.

Another book recently published with an Imprimatur is concerned with the priest in our time. It was written by a group of Catholic priests and laymen and includes one brutally sincere study of priests who have abandoned their priesthood. The author of this section is himself a priest, Father Nazzareno Fabbretti. According to him, the number of fallen-away priests is "very great" and he divides them into two groups, those who break openly with the Church and those who lack the moral courage to do so and

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remain within like a fifth column. The most frequent reason for desertion is "pride and disillusion," sometimes accompanied by a lack of proper training due to hopelessly old-fashioned education. In some cases women come into the picture, first as myth, then as reality, and practically always in the end as grim anti-climax. Our attitude towards these priests, the author concludes, ought not to be one of judgment or condemnation but one of prayer and mercy, in the manner referred to by Saint Augustine, who asked: who is the man who has committed such a crime that I would not be able to commit one which is worse?

ALL of this does not mean that the authority of the Church is weakened among Italians. It means that the relations between the Italian faithful and their Church is a good bit more familiar than is the case with other Catholics. The only reason for this state of affairs seems to be that the Church happens to have its temporal headquarters in Italy—a fact that gives the Italian Catholic an almost unique position in the Catholic world. His familiarity with the Church gives him a chance to discuss new matters being proposed to the Church's center as well as the matters on which the Vatican has issued a new decree of some sort. To Italians, the famous "Rome has spoken" never sounds as absolute as it does to Catholics far away. The whole Italian atmosphere is strangely fluid; people are reluctant to say the last word about anything. What seems to be involved is a mixture of the hereditary experience of an old race and the quick, almost instinctive understanding of human motives common to all Latins.

The case of Nomadelphia, the "city where brotherhood is law," is characteristic in this context. Nomadelphia, as might be remembered, was frowned on by the Holy See, very much as the French worker priests were, and its founder, Don Zeno Saltini, was ordered to leave the foundation. (One reason for this action, among others, was the financial condition of Nomadelphia.) I do not bring this up to discuss Nomadelphia itself, which undoubtedly had committed mistakes, but to illustrate how this Italian problem child of the Church has been dealt with. For example, the founder, Don Zeno, has always obeyed his superiors. Yet just before an election campaign he felt free to publish a book violently attacking the Christian Democrats, saying that they are as far from the ideals of Christianity as the Communists. The book was widely criticized and its publication deplored, but no penalties were applied to Don Zeno himself.

Nomadelphia had at first disbanded when Don Zeno was ordered away, but most of its members remained faithful throughout the ordeal. Now they have gathered together again, supported by numerous Catholic friends, and today they enjoy the best of relations with their local bishop. In the meantime, Don Zeno had asked to be reduced to the lay state, in order to be able to care for them, as he felt responsible for their plight. This request was granted by the Holy See and it was expressly stated that this act was not to be understood as punishment, but as, according to canon law, *pro gratia*. During this critical period Don Zeno was in constant contact with his superiors, among them Cardinal Ottaviani in the Holy Office, and still maintains close contact with them. The story of Nomadelphia's relations with the Vatican thus far is characteristic of Italy; in another Catholic country they very probably would have taken a different course.

Then there are the Italian Popes. No one in Rome talks seriously any more about the non-Italian Cardinals as possible successors to Pius XII. Most people seem to agree that during the last centuries the Italian Popes, for all their human weaknesses, have had great qualities—among them the ability to liberate themselves from nationalism to the point of sometimes strongly opposing their own nation. Would French or German or Spanish popes have done the same? Most of the Italian Popes have also proven to be outstanding diplomats—an important quality in centuries when all sorts of nationalisms have been almost endemic. Sometimes it is fascinating, as well as highly instructive, to watch the timeliness, the smoothness, the psychology and the kindness with which the Secretariat of State and the other organs of the Vatican act, not only on the highest levels, but even on their lower echelons. If Monsignor Bacci's *bon mot* is true and Vatican diplomacy has traditions as far back as Saint Peter, it also seems that the Italian Popes have received "the charism of diplomacy."

GUNNAR D. KUMLIEN.

AN APPEAL

Sister Bernadine, Christ the King Convent, Lakshmipuram, Mysore, South India, seeks funds for her hard-pressed Carmelite community. "We have a convent home we are just building and attached to it is our home for the poor and destitute and the block for the school. Our charges must be fed, clothed and educated. Your great country will never realize the poverty of India. We walk and we ask. We beg and we work and what we get goes for food for ourselves and the poor entrusted to our care. So for other material wants—Ah—we just pray. Providence can provide, Providence will provide." Sister Bernadine also seeks aid in providing tuition for the courses required to enable three Sisters in the community to secure teaching certificates. Readers may send their donations directly to Sister Bernadine (Airmail Postage to India: 25¢).

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THE SCREEN

BING ON A BINGE

MOVIE reviewers love to point with pride at film versions of plays that are better than the originals. They can point with pride at "The Country Girl." While Paul Kelly and Uta Hagen gave very good performances in the stage production of Clifford Odets' play about an irresponsible actor who blames his long-suffering wife for his drinking, this story seems to work out better in the movies—especially as it was adapted by George Seaton to allow for greater freedom of movement and place. For one thing, the movie allows us to go into the theater and see Bing Crosby as the faded and washed-up actor trying out for the lead role in a musical play; it later allows us to watch rehearsals and see part of the finished production. Furthermore, through a short flashback, it shows an episode which illuminates the actor's drinking and irresponsibility.

"The Country Girl" is much more complicated than most movies in both character and plot; and it is full of surprises. Movies being what they are, with a star system that often demands a certain type of casting, the biggest surprise in this movie is in its casting. While I don't mean to detract at all from the exceptionally fine performances given in this film, I think first honors should go to Producer William Perlberg for his selection of the cast and to Director-writer George Seaton for guiding these actors so well in the meaty roles.

This isn't the first time that Bing Crosby has handled a role that is a definite departure from his previous work. In "Going My Way" and in "Little Boy Lost" he tried things new and difficult; in "The Country Girl" he surpasses himself and gives a performance so good that it is hard to imagine anyone else in the role. Playing an actor who everyone—except those in the know—thinks is so easy-going and likable, Crosby has plenty of opportunity to turn on the old charm. But through the surface charm we see the man who is a liar, a weakling who resorts to drink, and an actor of great ability—when he can lean on his wife. Grace Kelly, who was radiant and beautiful in "Rear Window" and "Dial M for Murder," is plain and unadorned in the first part of "The Country Girl." She is just a girl from the country who was once attracted to the charming actor because of his weaknesses and now she is going to see him through. But she blossoms when the director, who has been wrongfully treating her with contempt for stifling the actor with her inadequacies, suddenly sees her for the courageous person she is and falls in love with her. William Holden, no longer the nice American boy, plays the director with some of the bitterness left over from "Stalag 17"; he sees most women starting out as Juliets and ending up as Lady Macbeths.

"The Country Girl" is by no means a pleasant picture, but it is certainly one of the year's most engrossing. And its honesty, in the scenes toward the end when Bing admits his drinking didn't start with his son's death and later when it agrees that there is no easy cure for alcoholism, is commendable. The picture has many tender and gripping moments, but its most unforgettable incident occurs in a police station to which Bing is taken after he goes on a binge, hangoverish and full of remorse. At this moment, "The Country Girl" is full of compassion and understanding for all alcoholics, and for those who live with them.

PHILIP T. HARTUNG.

COMMUNICATIONS

CATHOLICS AND LIBERALS

New York, N. Y.

TO the Editors: In reading your Thirtieth Anniversary Issue [Nov. 5], I was particularly interested in Mr. Clancy's article, "The Area of Catholic Freedom," which argues convincingly that the area of Catholic freedom includes most of the political and cultural issues of our time, and that on these issues the Church does not enjoin conservatism or unanimity of opinion among Catholics. There could be no better time than this for Mr. Clancy's plea for an expansion of freedom, charity, and tolerance for those with other views, both within and outside of the Church.

But something in the article makes a non-Catholic reader of the The Commonweal like myself wonder. The article speaks primarily to American Catholics. In the course of twenty paragraphs of reasoned argument, Mr. Clancy shows that American Catholics may be politically liberal, if they wish, without ceasing to be Catholic. He demonstrates the possibility of American Catholic liberalism. But certain phrases in the article ("The temptation that betrays many Catholics into diminishing the area of freedom . . . is . . . ," "We are thus frequently presented with a 'Catholic' position on every particular problem . . .") lead one to believe that Mr. Clancy fears he speaks for a minority of American Catholics, although by using words like "many" and "frequently" instead of "most" and "usually" he avoids making his fears explicit. Perhaps the crucial evidence that Mr. Clancy's view is indeed a minority view is that he wrote the article at all. Why should he write so many closely

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reasoned paragraphs to prove that American Catholics have the right to be as politically liberal as American non-Catholics assume they have the right to be to start with? Does not the very publication of this article imply a heavy conservative majority among politically active American Catholics?

A non-Catholic reader is apt to regard Mr. Clancy and the other editors of The Commonweal much as a liberal Democrat might regard Jacob K. Javits and Clifford Case. These are excellent, unexceptionable men, but they cannot be considered typical of their party. They must often be embarrassed to have to defend their crusty colleagues, and what are they doing in such a camp anyway? I realize that I argue from the assumptions of political liberalism, and that Mr. Clancy, for whom there is no analogy between a political party and the Church, would consider this assumption a hopelessly wrong-headed place to begin. But I believe that in making this criticism I speak for many non-Catholic readers of Mr. Clancy's excellent article.

FRANCIS B. RANDALL.

A REPLY

I THINK the first thing to be said in reply to Mr. Randall's comments is to admit the validity of several of his points. Indeed, much of what Mr. Randall says was accepted by me as the basis for writing my article in the first place. For example: there *is* a problem, and a pressing one, of the practical relationship between Catholics and what we in America call "liberalism;" as I wrote in my article, a large number of American Catholics *do* tend towards "conservatism in certain key areas of politics and culture;" the very writing of such an article probably *does* indicate that it represents a minority view. On these points Mr. Randall and I agree.

Where we disagree profoundly—as Mr. Randall himself indicates—is in the assumptions from which we argue. Mr. Randall argues from "the assumptions of political liberalism" and, I would guess, uses these assumptions as his criteria for measuring political-cultural reality. He is "Liberal," therefore, in the philosophical meaning of the term. I argue from the assumptions—in my view the unalterable truths—of Catholicism and use these as my criteria for judging ideas and movements in the temporal order. I do not accept Liberalism as a valid philosophical approach to the problems of man and the universe.

On such questions as the origin, nature, and destiny of man, the basis of society, the origin and limits of authority, the foundation and sanction of the moral law, for example, Catholic answers are different from Liberal answers, and this fact should (in all fairness) be made clear. For on questions such as these Catholics are united in their opposition to what philosophical Liberalism has historically stood for; in such matters they cannot admit a compromise to make their position more palatable. If a Catholic changed his position substantially on these ultimate issues he would, by definition, cease to be a Catholic.

Nevertheless, I see the Catholic-Liberal question as complex. I do not think that Catholics and philosophical Liberals should deceive themselves that they agree in their basic assumptions. They do not, nor can they, as long as they remain, respectively, Catholics and philosophical Liberals. I do think, however, that fundamental disagreements should not blind them to large areas in which they can agree on practical questions—questions that relate to immediate political and cultural issues. They can both support, for example, freedom of conscience, and should unite to defend it when it is endangered, even though they may defend it for radically different reasons. They must be wary of too easy labels, refusing to react automatically against something because it is called, on the one hand, "liberal," on the other, "Catholic." For they may frequently find that behind the label is something they both cherish.

Mr. Randall is (again) correct when he observes that I wrote my article primarily for an American Catholic audience. Had I written for a non-Catholic liberal audience the article would have been given a quite different direction and emphasis. Writing for a Catholic audience, however, I tended to emphasize those values usually called "liberal" (freedom of opinion in matters non-religious, etc.) that, in spite of their label, a Catholic should support. In so doing was I acting in a role analogous to the role of Jacob Javits or Clifford Case in the Republican party—seeking, as it were, to infiltrate a novel view into traditional ranks? I do not think so. Again, the situation is not as simple as that.

There are profound historical and philosophical reasons for past—and present—distrust of liberals among Catholics. To the extent that liberals continue to advance the *doctrines* associated with historical, European-style Liberalism—in other words, philosophical Liberalism—their efforts must be opposed by all Catholics, including myself. And much of the blame for distrust of the liberal label by Catholics must be laid squarely at liberalism's own door. But in spite of all this, in spite of past mistakes, misunderstandings and bitterness, in spite even of present basic differences, a way must be explored for cooperation between men of good will wherever it is possible on the *practical* level. This does not mean to minimize real differences. It means, however, that in spite of differences we must discover those values we hold in common.

WILLIAM P. CLANCY.

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The Logic of Survival in a Thermonuclear Age

POWER AND POLICY. By Thomas K. Finletter. Harcourt, Brace. $5.

By GEORGE W. JAEGER

IN the mounting debate on strategic policy set off by the emergence of Soviet atomic power, Mr. Finletter has played a prominent role as advocate and clarifier. In a series of recent statements the former Secretary of the Air Force and minister to Great Britain has been concerned with explaining the major implications of this great shift in world relationships: that our ability to deter war from now on depends on maintaining margins of superiority so great as to make attack appear unprofitable; that this means developing an "atomic-air" capable of massive retaliation *after* absorbing all an enemy can deliver; and that to achieve this, much remains to be done.

He has therefore pleaded for greater air budgets and more adequate continental defense, for more research and development, and for Defense Department reorganizations to assure that crucial atomic-air priorities are not whittled away in interservice jockeying. Now in this book these immediate recommendations emerge from the context of an analytic framework in which Mr. Finletter brilliantly develops the intricate interdependence of military and foreign policy and relates them to the new conditions imposed by the dynamic of weapons development.

In his recent speech at Guild Hall Sir Winston Churchill reflected a growing sentiment when he hoped that we may soon find ourselves moving along the broad, smooth causeway of peace, instead of "roaming and peering around the rim of hell." Underlying this and similar statements by our own President are grave anxieties concerning the suicidal implications of an uncontrolled "nucleonic" race and a growing belief that unflagging political efforts at limiting areas of conflict can alone create the atmosphere in which weapons controls can be developed. Mr. Finletter argues forcefully that the only safe resolution of this tragic impasse lies in the admittedly unlikely achievement of enforced disarmament. We may ask whether constructive diplomacy could not avoid an ultimate disaster short of this difficult solution. But regardless of the form of a possible political solution everyone is agreed that in the meantime there is no choice but to continue to rely on massive retaliatory power. With the end of atomic monopoly, however, we must, as the defensive power, for the time being continue to achieve such substantial margins of superiority as to make offense prohibitive. Whether this is a technically feasible propostion on which to rest our future is the next question.

For the business of staying strong is no longer just a matter of getting political support to maintain forces at an adequate level. Preparedness in the nuclear age depends on making technological "breakthroughs" before others do, being flexible enough to appreciate the implications of the resultant situations quickly, and having the means of making the necessary domestic and foreign adjustments. Within a period of a few years this may mean building multi-billion dollar radar fences and abandoning them as quickly for equally demanding new devices to meet new challenges. It may mean reorientation of coalitions around new strategic concepts, or the ability to completely revamp domestic attitudes on economics or foreign policy. In short, the technological dynamic provides a giddy multiplicity of challenges of the type which, in Toynbee's scheme of things, have at a much slower pace made or broken civilizations.

Of this steep curve of technological evolution, which we must apparently learn to climb, we can now only see a short segment. For we are just drawing to the close of "Phase I" of the atomic era in which the U.S. had absolute monopoly in nuclear weapons and in the means of delivering them. With the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons by the USSR, which now is building the modern jet bombers capable of carrying them, we are about to move into "Phase II"—and must, as is the purpose of this book, rigorously reexamine the assumptions on which our strength has to be based under these new conditions. Hard ahead Mr. Finletter, and other military experts, can already see "Phase III," in which intercontinental ballistic missiles will make obsolete many of the offensive and defensive arrangements valid in Phase II.

What may follow in Phase IV is mercifully spared us. However the sample is sufficient to explain Mr. Finletter's belief that while in the short run "overwhelming preponderance" is the only defense, in the long run only political solutions offer hope against the growing likelihood of slipping over the rim. For as an administrator it is clear to him that human capacities may sooner or later fail to respond to the requirements of succeeding "nucleonic" phases and so are too likely to lay the world open to ultimate dangers.

This is the underlying argument. In its framework Mr. Finletter sets his analysis and recommendations for the present transition from Phase I to Phase II.

Mr. Finletter's recommendations for the immediate expansion of our atomic retaliatory power and our air defenses are developed in the interrelating context of contemporary foreign policy, strategic and budget considerations. They rest, as we have seen, on the strategic assumption, most recently explained by Mr. Dulles, that we must rely on retaliatory power to deter war; although Mr. Finletter argues that this may be more reliable in Europe, where the main enemy is confronted by the NATO alliance geared to instant resistance, than in the "grey areas" of the Near and Far East,

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where the consent of allies to use overseas bases to retaliate massively may be harder to obtain, and where unilateral use of atomic weapons against anything but the main enemy may involve grave reactions throughout Asia. It is therefore all the more surprising that he argues against reserving any conventional forces for grey area contingencies, and places almost exclusive reliance on political, economic and psychological resources to supplement our atomic deterrent power to shore up this difficult region. By excluding limited war, even in theory, it would seem to me we would simply increase the difficulty of holding areas for which we are not prepared to risk all-out war, compound the problem of forming the coalitions Mr. Finletter calls for to secure Asian objectives, and aggravate the danger of stumbling into global war.

At home Mr. Finletter's greater priorities for atomic air and air defense call for substantially higher budgets and the reduction of other services to a level appropriate to their mission in Phase II. To assure such realistic force level decisions he would fix this responsibility in the Secretary of Defense, aided by some permanent assistants, rather than in the Joint Chiefs who tend to "divide the pie"; and he would reorganize the services into a new two, rather than the current three—who have to be coordinated by a fourth. Within this framework he would, among other things, place much greater emphasis on research and development and on base-building programs, which by dispersing air power make it harder to destroy; and less on all those activities aimed at the long haul after a war starts. For in Phase II what you have on the day of attack is most crucial. His discussion of these points, particularly his analysis of the interdependence of policy and administration, are among the most interesting in this book.

Power and Policy is a tour de force of clarity in a field whose complexity is compounded by the fact that so few of its problems yield to satisfactory solutions. By developing his plea for greater immediate atomic air power in the full setting of present and future circumstances which impinge on it, Mr. Finletter has produced an anatomy of the terrible and interdependent dilemmas of our time. We may question his emphasis on massive retaliation to the exclusion of limited wars and ask at least for tolerance for the endeavors of diplomatists to seek some middle ground to the stark alternatives posed by the "balance of terror" and unlikely disarmament. However we are immensely indebted to Mr. Finletter for having been the first to pose these questions in so clear a framework and for having called with such great responsibility and vigor for the measures urgently necessary to meet our constantly growing dangers.

Man in Rebellion Against History

BLACK BANNERS, By Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn. Caxton Printers. $4.

By FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

BLACK BANNERS is a war novel about death—the death of simple men like Major Huber whose vision of existence began and ended with the placid presence of his wife who was so thoroughly blown up by American bombs that he was not left even the consolation of a relic; the death of idealists like the American flier Sergeant Delaney; the living death of women like Fraülein Anita, seducing the quite willing Ferdinand so that she can taunt him about his need to confess his "fun" to the Benedictine monks she so loathes for pretending to find meaning in a broken world.

The novel is one long procession of suicide, murder, insanity, and death. Its hero is a Bavarian Catholic nobleman who had "always known in the marrow of his bones that man, if he be man, lives for death while only the beasts live for life." Its author is an Austrian Catholic nobleman who quotes with approval one of his own characters —a German soldier, veteran of the Spanish War, a Protestant, dying in a military hospital—who raves deliriously about the Carlists from the hills of Navarre and the anarchists from the parched plains of Castile, the "bipolarity of the Sacred Heart flags and the black-red banners with skull and crossbones . . . the sweet yoke of Christ and the Jolly Roger." Standards shaken out in conflict by men who embraced one another in death, they sum up—for von Kuehnelt-Leddihn —that mystical union of liberty and order, anarchy and discipline, faith and flesh that he finds in the traditions of Central European Catholicism—in that ecstasy of the baroque, perhaps the most daring symbol in history of the God of Proverbs who played through the world, delighting in the children of men.

What may prove to have been the last agony of his Old World—paradox of liberty and authority—is the stage of this latest of Kuehnelt-Leddihn's novels. Georg, a Bavarian nobleman of the Catholic and Royalist underground that died so heroically and senselessly in July, 1944, and his American wife, Pat, watch their world as it is eaten away from within by the cynical fanaticism of an intransigent Nazism, as it is destroyed from above by a well-meaning but blind West, and as it is menaced by the onward-moving barbarism from the East. This is the world he savagely pens in a novel that misses greatness only because its author cares so deeply.

Black Banners is both a thriller and tract for the times. Occasionally the tract gets in the way of the thriller. Leddihn's heroes talk more philosophy than my experience leads me to think men talk when they are ducking bombs. His anxiety about getting over his message causes him, now and again, to write editorials into his text. This slows down the action of his story: it by no means destroys it.

Three characters are unforgettable: the Gestapo official, Wiebe-

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mann, who illuminates, in a flash, the essential identification of Nazism, Communism, and Egalitarianism—all working together for a "world of barracks and human beehives," a world without "castles, independent peasants and one-family houses," a world wherein the state sums up and represents faithfully the essential triviality of a technologized mob with neither honor nor chivalry; the Bavarian peasant Schweighofer who is firmly convinced that the rumors going around about the Holy Father's being Italian are Nazi propaganda; and the Croatian Colonel, Protić, a man without a country for "the past twenty-six years," who faces death with a grim humor, stating that heaven cannot be so bad a place because it is bound to resemble the old Austria of Franz Joseph.

Black Banners is a good novel, but above all it enshrines a vision of a man whose life's work attests to a refusal to bow down to the tyranny of history, to what Gabriel Marcel has called "the crowned ghost." The condemnation of what the author calls *"nostrism"*—the refusal to accept personal responsibility before God, the refusal to swim against the tide when it is running against human decency—is linked with a prayer, a hope almost without reason, that America (symbolized by the heroine) and Europe (symbolized by the hero) may yet effect a union based on mutual respect and understanding, a union working for the preservation of our common inheritance—the Christian civilization Hilaire Belloc once called "the standing grace of this world."

An Eternal War for Man's Soul

LOVE AND VIOLENCE. Edited by Frank Sheed. Sheed & Ward. $4.

By HELEN ISWOLSKY

NO book could have a more pertinent title than this. Love and violence is indeed a crucial paradox of human nature. A series of profound essays on this paradox is presented here. The essays were originally written for the French *Etudes Carmelitaines* and it is fortunate that an able translator, George Lamb (who is also one of the contributors), has made them accessible to the English reader.

Love and Violence states the main elements of a conflict which has preoccupied men of good will throughout the ages; it has also preoccupied men of evil will who seek to prove that both love and God are dead. This book acknowledges that love and violence wage a ceaseless battle for the soul of man.

In the last essay in the volume George Lamb writes: "We must not confuse the spiritual eye with the eye of flesh and blood. We must not confuse a vision of violence with the behavior of violence. These things are opposites: they go by contraries. The thug has no violent visions. He has no visions at all." In other words, human events are but a reflection of the final vision, and therefore we cannot solve our problem on earth, *hic et nunc*, completely and immediately.

The first essay, "War and Love," by Gustave Thibon leads us to the crux of the problem: "The most hellish war in history has come to an end," writes Thibon, "but mankind is still pulverized and infected in its inmost being. . . .To reach true peace, it is necessary to enter into the very thick of the battle and get beyond war only by transcending it." Mr. Thibon is not optimistic about the practical possibilities of such a transcendence. (Who could be?) War, he tells us, must first be purified: "Despite the growing horror of modern warfare, mankind as a whole is not yet ready for absolute, universal non-violence. . . ." Grace alone can enable us to overcome hatred.

The art critic René Huygue writes of love and aggressiveness in various schools of painting. Another specialist in art, Anthony Berthram, describes the tragedy of Michaelangelo. He analyzes the great man's inner conflict. Mr. Berthram quotes some of Michaelangelo's "terrible lines," where we behold a genius "burning in the shadows, prostrate on the earth and weeping."

In another essay George Parchimeney studies the "Problem of Ambivalence." The author reminds us that the word "ambivalence," first launched in 1911, meant at that time "a paradoxical unity composed of contrary tendencies, which had been found, nevertheless, to exist in some sort of association with each other." But such an association in this first interpretation only existed "in the delirium of schizophrenia or in the oniric thoughts of normal persons." Today, the word "ambivalence" is applied to all: normal, abnormal and sub-normal. In Freud's works, the idea of ambivalence can be traced in its "most logical and coherent form." In connection with Freud and the other exponents of psychoanalysis and psychopathology, the question arises: "Does psychic life bear in the profoundest depths of its structure an indissoluble bond between this twin pair, love and violence?" The answer is yes.

A solution to this problem, (if solution there be) appears in Father

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Victor White's essay, "Love and Wrath in Saint Paul," "God of Wrath and God of Love," by Père Philippe de la Trinité, and in Michael Mason's "Mysterium Tremendum." Another solution is offered in Jacques Madaule's "Love and Aggressiveness in Dostoyevsky." This last essay is a profound analysis of a great novelist, who through so many tragic conflicts and a very *cluster* of ambivalences, testified on behalf of a Christian solution: there is, in Dostoyevsky, Madaule tells us, a love, a tenderness, which triumphs over aggressiveness. ". . . Only the charity of Christ, because it is a love from which no one is excluded, can save us from the abyss."

After a careful reading of *Love and Violence* one may still feel however, that the problem is unsolved. And unsolved, indeed, it shall probably remain. Pascal said: "Christ will be in agony until the end of the world." But at the foot of the Cross, as this book clearly shows us, we may hear the glad news of Love triumphant.

Pain, Knowledge, and Ceremony

THE WIDOWS OF THORNTON. By Peter Taylor. Harcourt, Brace. $3.75.

By RICHARD HAYES

PETER Taylor writes of a Southern world everywhere present and tangible, but subtly, the center of his fiction is displaced in time: the mind, solaced by the wit, the elegiac temper and tender sensibility of these histories of fine consciences, is yet compelled to view them with an astonishing spaciousness of perspective. For what Mr. Taylor has achieved is the portrait of a complex society held in the most fastidious dramatic suspension; the past impinging upon and molding the present, the present rebelling against the tyranny of the past, the noisy warring of both in the abused heart. A fluid traffic in time animates these stories: we embark only to be borne back swiftly and ceaselessly into a history which first shaped their decisive and controlling images of spirit.

In form, *The Widows of Thornton* is a theme with variations, the theme that of the precarious individual consciousness assaulted by a tide of ancestral household pieties. "In the destructive element, immerse:" so spoke Henry James, and Mr. Taylor remorselessly submits his characters to that heavy flood, guiding their uncertain hands in a search for the pearl of self-knowledge. For the three women of "Their Losses" (a perfect story) there is no knowledge, only pain: rigid in the ceremonial postures of their society, dully they resent the insolence of time, but the arid landscape through which they pass, the very deaths which brought them together, mock their superfluous tragedy. For the mother in "A Wife of Nashville," the old man of "Porte-Cochere," the maiden aunts set adrift in "The Death of a Kinsman" and "Two Ladies in Retirement," there is pain *and* knowledge, stiffened with impotence. How well

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they know that "things fall apart, the center will not hold," yet time has written their history in too firm a hand, they are powerless to alter the pattern. Mr. Taylor explores their journeys to the interior with a master's guile and quickening compassion; those passages in which—amid the dry desert of ritual which sustains them—they suddenly confront their own private beasts in the jungle, have an amplitude, a gathering power and *security of feeling* wholly triumphant.

It is, however, in "The Dark Walk," a long story which concludes the book, that Mr. Taylor makes the fullest explicit and symbolic statement of his themes. The woman of "The Dark Walk" was bred in Thornton, "the old, dying town on the bluffs above the Tennessee River" which has nourished so many of Mr. Taylor's characters. Her life is a passage from city to alien city, preceded always by great furniture vans carrying "the old and useless and inherited." With age and widowhood comes the perception for which her life has been a long and subterranean preparation: knowledge that "in some way or other all the men of that generation in that town had been killed in the old war of her grandfather's day. Or they had been set free by it. Or their lives had been changed in a way that the women's lives were not changed. . . . And their brides lived as widows clinging to things the men would never come back to and from which they could not free themselves." She has made that most momentous of discoveries, the discovery of a self, and we leave her, sloughing off the husks of the past, anticipating "only what was new and useful and pleasing to the eye," but like the heroine of Katherine Anne Porter's *Old Mortality*, making that vow, too, "in her hopefulness, her ignorance."

Above the sweet and quiet sound of Mr. Taylor's voice telling us all these unimpeachable truths, rises an echo of that harsh lament which subtly counterpoints the languid tone of Southern literature: a lament for the wound that was the Civil War, grief for the dark, terrible wrong of slavery. A defeated land, conscious of its defeat, and sustained by a tradition of "ceremony, belief and dynastic observance," offers to the writer the advantages of a special situation. Mr. Taylor has seized but never exploited them; his books deepen and refine a major vein of the American experience. Yet no single place, nor parish nor even country can claim him, for Turgenev and Chekhov, heirs and witnesses to a similar society, would have found in these stories truth and pleasure, art and life.

The Terrible Fact

TOTALITARIANISM. Edited with an introduction by Carl J. Friedrich. Harvard. $6.50.

By WILLIAM PFAFF

IT can fairly be said that our age is the age of totalitarianism: a unique bloom in the history of political systems, one which is not clearly understood, and one which

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we will, I suspect, see a great deal more of in the future. The term has become a convenient epithet in the armory of political controversy, and the character of the phenomenon, unique and terrible, has lost definition.

This book is an attempt at definition and understanding. It is a collection of the papers delivered at a conference on totalitarianism held in 1953 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, together with a number of comments on those papers. Inevitably uneven, product as it is of many people, it is both illuminating and aggravating but on balance a serious contribution to our understanding of totalitarianism. As the editor, Carl Friedrich, remarks, clarification of the issues rather than the settlement of them was the aim of the conference. I would go further and choose illumination rather than clarification as the word for this book.

The basic questions are given a searching consideration: whether totalitarianism is unique (as this reviewer would argue) or not; what its relations are to national economies and to populations; what the function of terror is in totalitarianism. There is a discussion of its origins and relationship to the older political systems (and, in the opinion of one contributor, to Catholicism), and some unsatisfactory comments on the means which might be used to combat it. Among the most serious contributions are those of Hannah Arendt (whose book, *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* is fundamental to any discussion of the subject), the late Waldemar Gurian and Mr. Friedrich; the most eloquent is that of the somber humanist, George Kennan.

Unfortunately the book includes some papers which are of rather questionable value in a discussion of totalitarianism whatever their other merits may be. One suspects that they were work-in-progress hastily given an orientation towards totalitarianism for the purposes of the conference. But there is enough quality ore here to compensate; and every contributor has something intelligent to add. There is fascination here, especially in the early pages, not unlike the fascination of horror fiction, and the subject here is not fiction.

REVIEWERS

George W. Jaeger is a teaching-fellow at Harvard University.

Frederick D. Wilhelmsen is the author of *Hilaire Belloc: No Alienated Man* and a member of the philosophy faculty at Santa Clara.

Helen Iswolsky, a member of the Russian Institute at Fordham University, is an editor of *The Third Hour* and the author of *Soul of Russia.*

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